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Banks have been revising their business models since the ¯nancial crisis, diversifying income
sources to pursue pro¯tability and stability in a rapidly evolving environment. The e®ectiveness
of this strategy is still debated. We investigate if revenue diversi¯cation of 1250 EU and US
banks improved performance or its stability between 2008 and 2016. We adopt a broad
econometric approach and de¯ne diversi¯cation as the share of non-interest revenue and the HH
index of the net operating income. We ¯nd that diversi¯cation is not clearly associated with
performance or its volatility, that bene¯ts change remarkably over time and, where present,
show signi¯cant variability. Our results support recent evidence on the limitations of diversi-
¯cation in banking, raising potential concerns on converging supervisory practices and general
calls for revenue diversity. The variability of business models and the impacts of di®erent
economic and institutional environments matter.
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The evolution of business models is inherent to all ¯rms. In the banking sector, this
process showed an increased speed over the last decade. Leading changes include
¯nancial innovation and technological advances but extend to shifts in clients' be-
havior and lessons learnt from the ¯nancial crisis and embedded in recent supervisory
and regulatory responses.
Diversi¯cation appears as a natural choice in order to restore or strengthen
pro¯tability in an uncertain environment. If excessive concentration could threat
stability, banking diversi¯cation seems unable to be free from drawbacks: the recent
academic debate underlines its limitations and the lack of unambiguous results.
Nonetheless, supervisors call for more income diversi¯cation, especially in Europe
where the focus on traditional commercial banking is high. Fee-based revenues could
be able to counterbalance the degrading quality of loan portfolios and smooth
pro¯tability patterns. However, during recessions, an increase in volatility and co-
variance of income sources can o®set diversi¯cation bene¯ts and lead to a return to
concentration.
The appearance and growth of FinTech companies, despite being worth a frac-
tion of the global banking business, is both a threat and an opportunity for banks
struggling with performance, with impacts on traditional (for example, interest in-
come arising from ¯nancing SME's working capital digitalizing assessment processes)
or diverse sources of revenues (for example, fees and commissions generated from
automated asset management advice services).
Moreover, as a response to the ¯nancial crisis, regulation and supervision changed
dramatically worldwide, but with timing, breadth and depth that vary widely across
countries. Changes in regulatory capital absorbed by di®erent activities, in quantity
and quality of scrutiny within the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process
(SREP), together with unprecedented changes in the underlying environment (above
all, the EU Banking Union) are crucial drivers conditioning banks' business models,
operations, pro¯tability and stability over time.
The purpose of this paper is to test the attitude of revenue diversi¯cation in
enhancing bank pro¯tability or reducing its volatility. In particular, we examine the
relationship between the degree of diversi¯cation (i.e. the share of non-interest in-
come or the HH Index of the net operating income) and alternative declinations of
risk-return pro¯les.
As a sample to test our hypotheses, we build a dataset of 1250 listed EU and US
banks for the period between Q1-2008 and Q4-2016.
In terms of methodology, we ¯rstly explore the cross-sectional nature of our data
through OLS regressions on mean values. Then we employ a dynamic ¯xed-e®ect
panel model to assess its time dimension. Finally, we run static panel regressions to
compare within and between dynamics of our panel data.
Our contribution is to empirically test if diversi¯cation bene¯ts hold in a cross-
country dataset, through di®erent econometric approaches, over a recent sample
























































































period experiencing di®erent macroeconomic conditions and evolutionary trends in
business models.
While an extended literature investigates the e®ects of revenue diversi¯cation on
banks' risks and performance in the US (for example, De Young & Rice 2004a, 2004b,
Stiroh 2004), Europe (Kohler 2014, Kholer 2015, Mergaerts & Vander Vennet 2016)
and Emerging Markets (Berger et al. 2010a, 2010b), there are almost no studies
comparing US and EU banks for a period including both the subprime and the
European sovereign crisis. Additionally, our paper di®ers also in investigating a
sizeable cross-country sample including both bigger and smaller institutions, through
quarterly data, in order to enhance the computation of revenues volatility. Finally,
we are also able to compare big EU and US banks, as well as bigger and smaller US
banks (due to the lack of small listed banks in EU).
We ¯nd that EU and US banks behave signi¯cantly di®erent in terms of diver-
si¯cation bene¯ts. European banks lack evidence of positive impacts of non-interest
revenues on both nominal and risk-adjusted performance measures. For the US,
instead, e®ects are signi¯cant in terms of performance volatility and risk-adjusted
pro¯tability, but substantially di®erent between smaller and larger institutions.
Finally, e®ects are stronger between banks rather than within: in other terms, ¯rm-
speci¯c diversi¯cation strategies and the ability to adapt to the environment seem to
matter more than revenue diversity over time.
Our results convey signi¯cant implications. On one hand, the convergence of
supervisory frameworks may prove unable to grasp fairly advantages and dis-
advantages of diversi¯cation across di®erent business models. Additionally, a gen-
eralized call for increased revenue diversity does not seem to be backed by empirical
data: we provide evidence that bene¯ts are contingent on \which" diversi¯cation, as
well as \where" and \when" it occurs.
This paper is structured as follows. In Sec. 2, we provide the review of the lit-
erature. In Sec. 3, we describe our sample, data, variables and econometric strategy.
In Sec. 4, we discuss our ¯ndings and their policy implications. Finally, in Sec. 5, we
provide our conclusions.
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
A bene¯cial \portfolio-e®ect" generated by revenue diversi¯cation is common wis-
dom in banking management. Goddard et al. (2007) analyze the European banking
system since the mid-1980s, showing that banks' response to the changing compet-
itive environment has usually included several key strategies: diversi¯cation, product
di®erentiation and consolidation. However, the empirical research on the link be-
tween diversi¯cation and risks or pro¯tability shows mixed results.
We review the leading literature according to the geographical area of the sample
(North America, Europe, Emerging Markets and cross-country). Then, we examine
the literature focusing on causes and consequences of income diversi¯cation.
























































































North America. For the US, Boyd & Graham (1986), using a wide sample of large
bank holding companies (BHCs) during the period 1971–1983, note that extending
to non-bank activities increases the risk of failure. Demsetz & Strahan (1997),
studying a sample of BHCs during the period 1980–1993, ¯nd that better diversi¯-
cation does not translate into risk reduction. De Young & Roland (2001) test
whether changes in product mix a®ect earnings volatility in 472 commercial banks
between 1988 and 1995. They ¯nd that switching to fee-based activities generates an
increase in leverage and also in volatility of revenues and earnings. De Young & Rice
(2004a), examining 4712 commercial banks between 1989 and 2001, ¯nd that mar-
ginal increases in non-interest income are associated with poorer risk-return trade-
o®s. In another study, De Young & Rice (2004b) analyze banks during the period
1986–2003 and ¯nd that diversi¯cation gains from fee-based activities appear to be
scarce: fee-income boosts bank earnings but increases their volatility.
Stiroh (2004) highlights that non-interest income is typically a volatile compo-
nent of income. At the bank level, a greater reliance on this revenue source is asso-
ciated with lower risk-adjusted pro¯ts and higher risks. Calmes & Liu (2009) ¯nd
that non-interest income has driven the variance of Canadian banks' aggregate op-
erating-income growth: by contributing to banking income volatility, market-ori-
ented activities do not necessarily yield diversi¯cation bene¯ts. Al-Obaidan (1999),
instead, analyzes a panel of US large commercial banks during the period 1985–1990,
and ¯nds that while diversi¯cation reduces technical e±ciency, it improves allocative
and scale e±ciency, generating an overall economic gain in the industry. Shim (2019)
provides evidence that increased loan diversi¯cation has a positive impact on the
bank's ¯nancial strength.
Europe. Focusing on European banks for the period 1996–2002, Lepetit et al.
(2008) show that bank expansion into non-interest income activities generates higher
risks, including insolvency. Baele et al. (2007), analyzing a panel of banks over the
period 1989–2004, ¯nd that a higher share of non-interest income positively a®ects
banks' franchise values, but increases their systematic risk. Acharya et al. (2006),
analyzing 105 Italian banks over the period 1993–1999, ¯nd that diversi¯cation fails
to produce greater performance and to reduce risks. Hayden et al. (2007), employing
a unique data set of individual bank loan portfolios of 983 German banks for the
period 1996–2002, ¯nd scarce evidence of signi¯cant links between performance and
diversi¯cation, that seems to be associated with reductions in bank returns, even
after controlling the risk. Busch & Kick (2009), through a panel of German banks
during the period 1995–2007, show that risk-adjusted returns on equity and total
assets are positively associated to higher fee-income activities; however, a strong
engagement in fee-generating activities goes along with higher risks. Again on Ger-
many, Kohler (2014) investigates the impact of non-interest income on bank risks
between retail and investment banks, showing that the former increases their sta-
bility if they expand their non-interest income, while the latter become riskier.
Mercieca et al. (2007), using a sample of 755 European small banks for the period
1997–2003, ¯nd an inverse association between non-interest income and bank
























































































performance. Kholer (2015), analyzing the impact of business models on bank sta-
bility in 15 European countries between 2002 and 2011, shows that banks are more
stable and pro¯table if they increase the share of non-interest income. Mergaerts &
Vander Vennet (2016), focusing on a large sample of banks from 30 European
countries over the period 1998–2013, ¯nd that higher levels of diversi¯cation are
associated with higher pro¯tability.
Emerging Markets and cross-country. On emerging economies, Berger et al.
(2010a), investigating Russian banks during the period 1999–2006, show that per-
formance tends to be non-monotonically associated to the diversi¯cation strategy. In
a second study, Berger et al. (2010b), focusing on Chinese banks during the period
1996–2006, ¯nd that di®erent forms of diversi¯cation are steadily associated with
lower pro¯ts and higher costs. Sanya & Wolfe (2011), studying 226 listed banks
across 11 emerging economies, provide evidence that diversi¯cation across and
within both interest and non-interest income sources reduces insolvency risk and
improves pro¯tability. Focusing on four South Asian banking markets (Bangladesh,
India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) during the period 1998–2008, Nguyen et al. (2012)
argue that banks become more stable through diversi¯cation across both interest
and non-interest income activities. Comparing Islamic and conventional banks,
Paltrinieri et al. (2020) show that diversi¯cation provides lower rewards for
Shariah-compliant banks than conventional ones.
Considering cross-countries' studies, Roengpitya et al. (2017), investigating a
panel of annual data relative to 178 banks from 34 countries for the period 2005–
2015, provide evidence that commercial banking models exhibit more stable pro¯t-
ability than trading, and banks switching to retail-funding see their return on equity
(ROE) improve by 2.5% on average, relative to non-switchers. Guerry & Wallmeier
(2017), assessing the e®ects of diversi¯cation on bank evaluation unveil that the
diversi¯cation discount decreases over time and vanishes after the ¯nancial crisis,
while Kim et al. (2020) ¯nd that a moderate degree of bank diversi¯cation increases
bank stability, but excessive diversi¯cation has an adverse e®ect.
Causes and consequences of diversi¯cation. A related stream of literature
examines causes and consequences of the e®ect that revenue diversi¯cation has on
pro¯tability and risks.
Chiorazzo et al. (2008), investigating Italian banks during the period 1993–2003,
¯nd that income diversi¯cation increases risk-adjusted returns, the association is
stronger at large banks, but limits to diversi¯cation gains exist as banks get larger.
Studying US credit unions for the period 1993–2004, Goddard et al. (2008) ¯nd that
similar diversi¯cation strategies are not appropriate for large and small credit unions.
De Jonghe (2010) argues that since diversifying ¯nancial activities in one
\umbrella" institution does not improve the stability of the banking system, ¯nancial
conglomerates usually trade at a discount. According to this statement, Laeven &
Levine (2007) ¯nd that there is a diversi¯cation discount for ¯nancial conglomerates
that engage in multiple activities. Elsas et al. (2010), using a panel data from nine
countries over the period 1996–2008, ¯nd robust evidence against a conglomerate
























































































discount: diversi¯cation increases bank pro¯tability and the resulting market
valuation.
Overall, the rich literature in this ¯eld corroborates the idea that revenue di-
versi¯cation is not necessarily bene¯cial, that its strength may depend on other ¯rm-
or environment-speci¯c variables, and that resulting gains on pro¯tability and risk
are far from being guaranteed. Stiroh & Rumble (2006) elegantly introduce the
concept of the \dark side" of diversi¯cation by arguing that volatile patterns in non-
interest income o®set the bene¯ts at the portfolio level: the (adverse) variance e®ect
may counterbalance the (positive) correlation e®ect. Under this assumption, the net
in°uence of revenue diversi¯cation on bank performances is ambiguous.
In line with this literature, we develop the following hypotheses to be tested.
We expect that an increase in the share of non-interest income, in years char-
acterized by market turmoil, is associated to negative performance measures (nom-
inal and risk-adjusted) and to increases in their volatility. Instead, a revenue
diversity measure able to capture di®erent potential directions of diversi¯cation and
concentration strategies should show the opposite behavior: an increase of this
variable should be associated with an improved performance and a reduced vola-
tility. However, we also expect to ¯nd a very weak signi¯cance of these two variables
once other ¯rm-level covariates are included as control variables, as well as a high
degree of diversity once comparing di®erent banks within di®erent banking systems.
H1. Non-interest income is associated with a poorer nominal or risk-adjusted per-
formance and an increase in its volatility.
H2. Diversi¯cation is associated with improvements in the nominal or risk-adjusted
performance and a decrease in its volatility.
H3. Both the share of non-interest income and the level of diversi¯cation are weakly
signi¯cant in explaining performance and its volatility.
H4. The ability of non-interest income and diversi¯cation to explain changes in
performance and its stability varies widely across banks and banking systems.
With reference to typical ¯rm characteristics, we expect a negative association with
performance and a positive association with its stability when considering the quality
of the loan portfolio, the weight of traditional lending activities for each bank and the
level of cost e±ciency.
3. Methodology and Data
3.1. De¯nition of variables
Since we are interested both in the level and volatility of bank pro¯tability, we use
seven di®erent dependent variables that are widely adopted in the banking literature
(Table 1).
























































































Typically, ROAE is more volatile than ROAA and is more in°uenced by bank
leverage: we use both variables to cross-check from di®erent points of view the e®ects
of revenue diversi¯cation on bank pro¯tability.
The expected positive portfolio-e®ect traditionally attributed to income diversi-
¯cation can be further investigated through volatility and risk-adjusted measures:
consistently with existing literature (Stiroh & Rumble 2006, Mercieca et al. 2007,
Goddard et al. 2008), we use the standard deviation and risk-adjusted versions for
ROAA and ROAE and the Z-Score.
According to Stiroh & Rumble (2006), we calculate two di®erent variables to
account for the level of income diversi¯cation: NONsh and DIV. NONsh measures
the share of net operating income represented by non-interest revenue (i.e. net
trading incomes, net fees and commissions incomes, net insurance incomes, other
non-interest incomes). Low levels of NONsh suggest the prevalence of traditional
banking activities (borrowing and lending), typical for commercial banks. In this
sense, a greater share of NONsh signals an income diversi¯cation strategy; however,
this source of revenue may prevail also in other business models (for example, in
corporate banking).
The second measure, DIV, accounts for this issue. This variable is built according
to the Her¯ndahl–Hirschman Index approach; it measures for each bank the overall
level of revenue diversi¯cation within the net operating income and it is calculated as
follows (Eq. (3.1)):
DIV ¼ 1 ½ðNONshÞ2 þ ð1 NONshÞ2: ð3:1Þ
By construction, DIV assumes values between 0 and 0.5; the minimum value is
associated with banks that exhibit a single source of operating revenues (i.e. maxi-
mum concentration). The maximum value of the variable is reached when there is an
equal contribution of interest and non-interest revenues in total operating income
(i.e. maximum diversi¯cation).
Consider two banks with a level of NONsh equal to 0.2 and 0.8, respectively.
According to Eq. (3.1), DIV is the same for both banks and equals to 0.32. This
means that, from a diversi¯cation point of view, despite these banks show the same
value for DIV, their mix of revenue sources is di®erent. This is the reason why both
NONsh and DIV are important for the estimation process and the interpretation of
¯ndings. Naturally, as observed by Stiroh & Rumble (2006), these covariates are
correlated; however, since DIV is a quadratic transformation of NONsh, the use of
both variables in a single estimation follows a mainstream behavior in literature.
Our set of independent variables includes also other information from banks'
¯nancials, with their expected signs disclosed also in Table 1. Firstly, we account for
size using the natural logarithm of total assets (TA): through this variable we control
\size e®ect" on pro¯tability and earnings volatility. To control leverage e®ects, we
include the ratio between the tangible equity and total assets (Equity/TA): typi-
cally, higher levels of this variable signal a greater resilience capacity of the bank in
troubled periods. Moreover, since we investigate a period characterized by a severe
























































































credit crisis, we observe the orientation towards lending through the ratio between
loans and total assets (Loans/TA).
To control banks' e±ciency and the quality of the credit portfolio, we include also
the cost-income ratio (Cost Income) and the ratio between the loan loss provision
and loans (LLP), the latter in lagged form in order to reduce endogeneity issues.
Finally, we include the level and squared value of asset growth to account for the
annual (non-linear) variation in bank size (Asset growth and Asset growth2).
3.2. Data
All data are obtained from the SNL Financial database, which includes a wide range
of bank ¯nancial information. We focus on banks from Europe and the US for the
period Q1 2008–Q4 2016 (36 quarters). Since we need quarterly data to calculate
pro¯t volatility for each year, we include in our sample only listed banks.
Saving banks, thrifts and mutual banks are excluded from the sample due to their
peculiar asset-liability composition. All data are converted in Euro, but potential
e®ects linked to exchange rates are captured using country and year dummies.
Table 1. Variables de¯nition.
Expected sign for performance
Type Variable Description Level Volatility
Dependent
variables
ROAA Return on average assets / /
ROAE Return on average equity / /
ROAA Standard deviation of ROAA / /
ROAE Standard deviation of ROAE / /
RAROAA Risk Adjusted Return on Average
Assets (ROAA/ROAA)
/ /
RAROAE Risk Adjusted Return on Average
Equity (ROAE/ROAE)
/ /
Z-Score (ROAA þ Equity/TA)/ROAA / /
Independent
variables
NONsh Non-interest revenues on
Operating Income
Negative Negative
DIV 1 – Her¯ndahl–Hirschman index
(built on NONSH)
Positive Positive
TA Natural Logarithm of total assets Uncertain Uncertain
Equity/TA Tangible equity over total assets Uncertain Uncertain
Loans/TA Net Loans over total assets Negative Positive
Cost income Cost income ratio (operating
expenses/operating income)
Negative Positive
LLP Loan loss provisions to loans Negative Positive
Asset growth Annual growth of total assets,
computed as ðTAt  TAt1Þ=
TAt1
Uncertain Uncertain
Notes: This table summarizes and de¯nes the variables used in our analysis. Independent variables are
end-of-year ¯gures, with the exception of Asset growth, which is the arithmetical growth rate of assets
between year t 1 and year t.
























































































We drop banks that show NONsh values outside the [0;1] range. Yearly obser-
vations based only on data from one quarter are excluded (to avoid distortion on
volatility measures), as well as banks with less than eight available quarters of data.
Pro¯tability measures (ROAA and ROAE) are built as the average of available
quarterly data for a speci¯c year: this is in line with the end-of-year value in the
database. However, quarterly data are necessary to build a measure of pro¯t vola-
tility for each year. In our dataset, this measure corresponds to the standard devi-
ation of ROAA and ROAE. Since a single quarterly data produces a null standard
deviation, we impose a ¯lter on data excluding years without at least two quarters of
available data.
The remaining variables are end-of-year ¯gures, whereas Asset growth is calcu-
lated as the arithmetic growth rate of assets between year t and year t 1.
The outcome of this selection process is a dataset that includes 1250 banks, with
over 95% of the sample from the US. In order to provide a more balanced view of the
results, we use a cut-o® of 3 billion Euros to split US banks into \bigger banks" and
\smaller banks". This threshold corresponds to the minimum value of Total Assets
observed in the European bank sample. Therefore, since all the European banks are
over the cut-o®, the \bigger US banks" sample is directly comparable with the
European one. Unfortunately, we do not have a sample of smaller European banks,
since in this area the average size of listed banks is greater than in the US. For the
Table 2. Panel composition.














US US (bigger) 134
US (smaller) 1056
Notes: This table summarizes our sample by geograph-
ical area. In order to split US banks into \bigger banks"
and \smaller banks", we use a cut-o® of 3 billion Euros,
a threshold corresponding to the minimum value of
Total Assets observed in the European sample. This
allows us to compare the \bigger US banks" sample with
the European one; furthermore, we can compare smaller
and bigger US banks.
























































































sake of our analysis, this process allows us to compare large US and EU institutions,
and large and small US institutions, that we consider consistent with the purpose of
testing the impact of diversi¯cation for di®erent market- and ¯rm-speci¯c back-
grounds.
The ¯nal sample consists of 60 European banks, 134 larger US banks and 1056
smaller US banks. The composition of our panel is outlined in Table 2.
Given the period of signi¯cant instability covered by our dataset, several vari-
ables show extreme values. We manage this issue through a winsorizing process
(2.5% on each tail of the whole sample of available observations).
Tables 3 presents the summary statistics of our variables for three di®erent
subsamples, averaged over the whole period under investigation.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics (mean values over the whole period).
Percentile
Variables No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min 25th 50th 75th Max
Panel A: EU Banks
ROAA 60 0.000* 0.007 0:028 0:003 0.002 0.005 0.017
ROAE 60 0.006* 0.099 0:380 0:055 0.031 0.071 0.161
ROAA 60 0.007 0.008 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.011 0.039
ROAE 60 0.112* 0.112 0.011 0.041 0.060 0.154 0.546
RAROAA 60 2.418* 2.641 1:009 0.662 1.938 3.582 13.762
RAROAE 60 2.272* 2.479 0:866 0.654 1.707 3.080 12.044
Z-Score 60 35.483* 27.298 1.888 20.494 29.610 43.398 163.926
NONsh 60 0.393* 0.121 0.123 0.302 0.412 0.481 0.580
DIV 60 0.430* 0.070 0.204 0.388 0.458 0.485 0.496
TA 60 17.745* 1.344 15.073 16.450 18.071 19.085 19.085
Equity/TA 60 0.058* 0.019 0.028 0.044 0.052 0.070 0.104
Loans/TA 60 0.586* 0.143 0.338 0.501 0.609 0.701 0.786
Cost income 60 0.654 0.117 0.484 0.559 0.641 0.724 1.072
LLP 60 0.012 0.008 0.001 0.006 0.011 0.015 0.034
Asset growth 60 0.021* 0.078 0:140 0:012 0.012 0.036 0.466
Panel B: Larger US banks
ROAA 134 0.006 0.008 0:033 0.005 0.008 0.011 0.018
ROAE 134 0.043 0.084 0:383 0.029 0.065 0.088 0.157
ROAA 134 0.006 0.008 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.044
ROAE 134 0.066 0.091 0.004 0.016 0.028 0.074 0.477
RAROAA 134 8.926 6.275 1:516 4.614 7.684 12.673 28.479
RAROAE 134 8.286 5.814 1:539 4.383 7.245 11.913 25.615
Z-Score 134 90.319 53.187 0.910 50.581 81.399 124.699 239.878
NONsh 134 0.276 0.118 0.057 0.203 0.271 0.340 0.580
DIV 134 0.365 0.098 0.106 0.322 0.383 0.438 0.495
TA 134 16.183 1.177 14.841 15.238 15.883 16.665 19.085
Equity/TA 134 0.089 0.019 0.040 0.079 0.088 0.099 0.172
Loans/TA 134 0.633 0.110 0.338 0.589 0.658 0.706 0.856
Cost income 134 0.671 0.121 0.474 0.596 0.661 0.726 1.203
LLP 134 0.010 0.009 0.002 0.005 0.008 0.013 0.049
Asset growth 134 0.102 0.086 0:140 0.058 0.095 0.151 0.290
























































































Our preliminary result shows that European banks are less pro¯table than the
corresponding US ones, have a higher exposure to non-interest revenues and are more
diversi¯ed.
The behavior of our target variables (mean values) for our three subsamples
(European banks, large US banks, small US banks) are provided in Fig. 1.
Performance measure (ROAA and ROAE), risk measures (standard deviation of
ROAA and ROAE), risk-adjusted measures (RAROAA, RAROAE and Z-Score)
and diversi¯cation measures (NONsh and DIV), respectively, show similar average
trends in the period under investigation but provide some interesting changes oc-
curred in the 2010–2011 years.
EU banks are associated with higher returns, lower standard deviation and
comparable risk-adjusted measures until 2010. From 2011 and afterwards, the trend
changed signi¯cantly. EU banks exhibit worse returns, higher standard deviations
and worse risk-adjusted performances, with this trend remaining consistent until the
end of our investigated period. In terms of diversi¯cation measures, however, the
behavior of our three subsamples remains relatively stable, with EU banks increasing
signi¯cantly especially in terms of NONsh.
3.3. Econometric estimations
In order to explore both the within and the between dimensions of our dataset, we
employ four di®erent set-ups in our econometric estimation.
Table 3. (Continued )
Percentile
Variables No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min 25th 50th 75th Max
Panel C: Smaller US banKS
ROAA 1056 0.002* 0.009 0:038 0:001 0.005 0.009 0.019
ROAE 1056 0.004* 0.119 0:518 0:015 0.042 0.074 0.161
ROAA 1056 0.008 0.009 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.011 0.052
ROAE 1056 0.099* 0.140 0.004 0.020 0.040 0.109 0.756
RAROAA 1056 4.930* 5.013 1:773 0.963 3.817 7.869 34.525
RAROAE 1056 4.392* 4.538 1:711 0.814 3.397 6.865 28.676
Z-Score 1056 67.338* 50.356 0.273 27.174 59.818 98.329 361.221
NONsh 1056 0.176* 0.097 0.026 0.104 0.166 0.229 0.580
DIV 1056 0.267* 0.105 0.057 0.183 0.272 0.348 0.496
TA 1056 12.711* 0.972 10.926 11.965 12.663 13.449 14.831
Equity/TA 1056 0.094 0.027 0.028 0.077 0.092 0.108 0.179
Loans/TA 1056 0.674* 0.101 0.338 0.615 0.688 0.746 0.858
Cost income 1056 0.804* 0.174 0.472 0.686 0.774 0.892 1.460
LLP 1056 0.009 0.009 0:001 0.004 0.007 0.011 0.049
Asset growth 1056 0.091 0.101 0:140 0.036 0.078 0.135 0.570
Notes: This table provides the descriptive statistics on our variables across the three subsamples under
investigation. The values marked with (*) means that, for the EU and the US smaller banks subsample,
are statistically signi¯cantly di®erent than the US larger banks.
























































































Following Stiroh & Rumble (2006), we start by calculating the mean value of
each variable over the time span of our dataset: this allows us to run an OLS
regression that explores the cross-sectional nature of the data.
Then, we use a dynamic ¯xed-e®ect panel regression on the original data to
explore the time dimension of our panel.
Finally, in order to compare the within and between dynamics of the panel data, we
run two static panel regressions using, respectively, within and between estimators.
3.3.1. Cross-sectional analysis
Equation (3.2) reports the baseline OLS model used to estimate the cross-section
e®ects of revenue diversi¯cation on banks' pro¯tability and risk-return measures.
i ¼ cþ 1NONshi þ 2DIVi þ  Xi þ "i; ð3:2Þ
where Xi is a vector of bank-speci¯c information, c is the intercept and "i is the error
term. All the variables are averaged over the whole period under investigation;
country dummies are included.
Notes: This ¯gure shows the trend over time across our three subsamples of the mean values for main
variables under investigation or targeted by our analysis. EU banks are represented by a solid line, bigger
US banks by a long-dashed line and smaller US banks by a short-dashed line.
Fig. 1. Target variables behavior over the timespan under scrutiny.

























































































Equation (3.3) reports the baseline dynamic panel model used to estimate the e®ects
of revenue diversi¯cation on banks' risk-return measures. We focus on these variables
because they are more appropriate for evaluating bank performance, since they di-
rectly account for both the pro¯tability and the riskiness (measured as the volatility
of pro¯ts).
i;t ¼ i;t1 þ 1NONshi;t þ 2DIVi;t þ Xi;t þ ci þ "i;t: ð3:3Þ
In this set-up, pro¯tability variables are averaged over each year; annual stan-
dard deviation measures for ROAA and ROAE express their volatility across the
available quarters of a speci¯c year. Covariates are end-of-year ¯gures. All regres-
sions include interacted year-country dummies: in static panel estimations, the
autoregressive term is omitted. Hausman tests suggest the use of ¯xed-e®ect esti-
mators against a random-e®ect speci¯cation; we also include regressions using be-
tween estimators in order to explore di®erent behaviors of within and between
components of the panel.
3.4. Robustness checks
In order to check the robustness of our results, we perform several additional esti-
mations, omitted for space constraints but available from authors upon request.
First of all, we test alternative regressions on original data, winsorizing on each
subsample and using di®erent winsorizing approaches (for example, 1% on each tail).
Our results are not a®ected.
We also try di®erent variable speci¯cations, in particular using the standard
deviation of ROAA and ROAE calculated on the whole period instead of on a yearly
basis. Again, our results do not change.
Third, since e±ciency and credit quality deterioration (namely, the cost-income
ratio and loan loss provisions) are potential components of the dependent variables,
we estimated all the regressions excluding these covariates. Once more, results are
con¯rmed.
Because of NONsh varying signi¯cantly in our panel data analysis, we perform a
full set of estimations comparing banks with a low level of NONsh with banks
showing high level of this covariate, based on the sample median value of NONsh
(0.30 for bigger banks and 0.17 for smaller banks). We ¯nd signi¯cant di®erences
arising only in Europe and only for high values, with a negative association with
RAROAE, RAROAA and the Z-Score, and a positive association with ROAE,
ROAA and their respective standard deviations.
Finally, since endogeneity concerns are crucial in estimations exploring pro¯t-
ability and diversi¯cation strategies, we use two-step system GMM models to ex-
amine the robustness of our results also in this direction. Once again, coe±cients sign
and statistical signi¯cance are in line with our main results presented as follows.
























































































4. Results4.1. Cross-sectional analysis
We conduct the ¯rst part of our analysis as follows: we ¯rstly consider EU and bigger
US banks, where comparability should be greater (Table 4), and then replicate the
analysis for smaller US banks.
Table 4 presents the results for European and bigger US banks in terms of both
level and volatility of pro¯tability.
A general lack of statistical signi¯cance of NONsh emerges, across all regressions.
DIV, on the other hand, shows a weakly signi¯cant negative e®ect on the level of
ROAA for the EU sample and a statistically signi¯cant negative e®ect on pro¯ts
volatility for larger US banks. In general, coe±cients deriving from pro¯t volatility
estimations are in line with our hypotheses H1 (NONsh positive for volatility) and
H2 (DIV negative for volatility), but statistical signi¯cance is more closely related
Table 4. OLS regression on mean values for returns and volatility (European and larger US banks).
ROAA (mean) ROAE (mean) ROAA ROAE
Variables US Europe US Europe US Europe US Europe
NONsh 0.01 0.00 0.08 0:02 0.00 0.01 0:02 0.15
(0.008) (0.009) (0.056) (0.120) (0.007) (0.008) (0.067) (0.145)
DIV 0.00 0:03* 0.06 0:24 0:01** 0:01 0:11** 0.03
(0.007) (0.015) (0.048) (0.200) (0.005) (0.011) (0.055) (0.181)
TA 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:01 0:00 0.00 0:01* 0:00
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.010) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.008)
Equity/TA 0.04** 0.00 0.19 0:03 0.02 0.02 0:45 0:56
(0.017) (0.052) (0.199) (0.809) (0.032) (0.041) (0.318) (0.830)
Loans/TA 0:01** 0:01 0:06* 0:18** 0:00 0.00 0:02 0.05
(0.002) (0.005) (0.031) (0.080) (0.004) (0.005) (0.043) (0.089)
Cost income 0:04*** 0:02** 0:38*** 0:28** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.32*** 0.33**
(0.004) (0.010) (0.049) (0.122) (0.006) (0.008) (0.073) (0.133)
LLP 0:32*** 0:26 3:30*** 5:44** 0.35*** 0.38** 4.09*** 3.66
(0.055) (0.158) (0.684) (2.209) (0.084) (0.144) (1.139) (2.868)
Asset growth 0.02** 0.02 0.29** 0.43** 0:03 0:02* 0:33* 0:41*
(0.009) (0.015) (0.139) (0.206) (0.016) (0.013) (0.183) (0.206)
Asset growth2 0:02 0:02 0:53* 0:84* 0.04 0.01 0.56 0.14
(0.017) (0.030) (0.298) (0.438) (0.032) (0.024) (0.367) (0.429)
Constant 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.31*** 0.61*** 0:01 0:02 0.05 0:16
(0.004) (0.014) (0.068) (0.226) (0.007) (0.014) (0.082) (0.207)
No. of Obs. 134 60 134 60 134 60 134 60
Adjusted R2 0.90 0.74 0.86 0.76 0.76 0.85 0.75 0.77
Notes: This table presents the impact of diversi¯cation on pro¯tability and stability measures using OLS
estimations for EU and larger US banks samples. Variables are averaged over the whole period. Dependent
variables of these estimations are the level and volatility of ROAA and ROAE. Non-interest income
(NONsh) and DIV are income diversi¯cation variables. The natural log of total assets (SIZE), the tangible
equity to total assets (Equity/TA), loans to total assets (Loans/TA), the cost to income ratio (Cost
income), lagged loan loss provisions (LLP), Annual growth of assets (Asset growth) and its square (Asset
Growth2) are the bank-speci¯c control variables. All regressions include country dummies. Robust stan-
dard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical signi¯cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
























































































with the expectations under H3 (NONsh and DIV are weakly and rarely signi¯cant)
and H4 (material variability across banking systems). Performance level estimations
provide mixed results.
Size is associated with negative but not statistically signi¯cant coe±cients: since
we are here comparing banks of similar size, the explanatory power of this variable is
reduced.
Leverage and loans share exhibit a mild e®ect on the dependent variables. It
emerges that a greater loan share depressed bank pro¯tability during the period
under examination: this outcome is not surprising given the speci¯c features of the
recent crisis.
A clearer role is played by e±ciency and loan quality: both variables (Cost In-
come and LLP) are associated with highly signi¯cant coe±cients that are negative
for pro¯tability levels and positive for volatility. As expected, lower levels of e±-
ciency and higher deterioration of credit portfolio quality depress pro¯tability and
increase pro¯t volatility. This e®ect is likely to be even stronger in a period of falling
margins.
Asset growth is associated with positive coe±cients in pro¯t level regressions and
negative ones in pro¯t volatility estimations; the quadratic term shows an opposite
sign, indicating that, as expected, a faster growth can generate more instability in the
risk-return pro¯le.
Table 5 shows the results for risk-adjusted performance measures.
We ¯nd that NONsh is constantly associated with negative coe±cients. Instead,
DIV shows positive coe±cients in the US sample, while the opposite happens for the
European one. Statistical signi¯cance is scattered, while it is more common in larger
US banks regressions; compared with Table 4 we observe more statistically signi¯-
cant coe±cients. This is due to the combination of level and volatility of pro¯ts,
which contribute to the computation of the dependent variables used in these esti-
mations. Risk-adjusted measures provide a more insightful picture on pro¯tability.
Results are therefore supportive of our four main hypotheses. Overall, outcomes
in Table 5 are also consistent with the literature (Stiroh & Rumble 2006): a contrast
exists between diversi¯cation bene¯ts and the potential adverse e®ect linked to more
volatile non-interest revenues.
Tangible equity and loans share exhibit mainly negative coe±cients.
Cost income and loan loss provisions are associated with negative and strongly
signi¯cant coe±cients, underlining the relevance of these two variables during the
recent crisis period.
Table 6 includes the results of econometric estimation for smaller US banks.
Overall, results con¯rm the previous analysis and are in line with all our hy-
potheses. NONsh increases the volatility of banks' pro¯ts and is associated with
negative coe±cients in risk-adjusted pro¯t regressions. DIV, on the contrary, reduces
volatility and gives bene¯ts to risk-adjusted performance measures. In this sub-
sample, characterized by a greater variability in the size of banks, TA shows positive
























































































and statistically signi¯cant coe±cients for risk-adjusted performance measures:
larger banks hence bene¯t in terms of RAROAA, RAROAE and Z-Score.
In these estimations, negative and signi¯cant coe±cients are associated with
leverage, loans share, cost-income ratios and loan loss provisions. The coe±cient for
Equity/TA in the last column is not surprising: the variable enters the equation used
to calculate Z-Score with a positive value.
Asset growth should promote pro¯tability, but the e®ect on its volatility may be
less immediate. In our ¯ndings, the coe±cients associated with the variable in risk-
adjusted performance regressions are not statistically signi¯cant: apparently, growth
may be bene¯cial for some entities and increase volatility for others, without an
easily predictable outcome.
Table 5. OLS regression on mean values for risk adjusted returns and the Z-Score (European and larger
US banks).
RAROAA RAROAE Z-Score
Variables US Europe US Europe US Europe
NONsh 10:58* 4:04 9:83* 2:31 123:94** 87:47*
(6.035) (4.127) (5.847) (3.662) (54.062) (43.879)
DIV 14.02** 1:59 14.42** 4:83 117.78* 55.99
(6.290) (4.744) (5.794) (4.604) (62.061) (69.015)
TA 0.20 1:00** 0.14 0:89** 4.76 6:24
(0.446) (0.398) (0.406) (0.371) (3.914) (4.566)
Equity/TA 37:44* 35:46** 33:68* 26:66 157.70 94:29
(21.634) (17.210) (19.777) (16.737) (226.848) (179.002)
Loans/TA 3:32 7:19*** 3:38 7:23*** 16.34 12:91
(5.278) (2.334) (4.740) (2.251) (42.724) (23.185)
Cost income 23:13*** 8:30** 23:39*** 6:55** 146:68*** 92:29**
(4.808) (3.234) (4.626) (2.822) (39.135) (38.358)
LLP 253:45*** 167:33** 234:25*** 161:76** 2472:98*** 1534:60**
(60.293) (74.366) (55.201) (66.799) (621.894) (697.425)
Asset growth 3.88 1.15 1.28 1.93 34.02 32:42
(10.808) (7.613) (10.401) (6.952) (112.361) (65.909)
Asset growth2 9:79 28:86** 10:46 26:47** 183:49 104:34
(24.725) (13.011) (23.574) (12.357) (249.538) (106.653)
Constant 27.04*** 39.09*** 27.01*** 35.57*** 107.63 279.42***
(9.650) (8.837) (8.689) (8.269) (79.913) (98.976)
No. of Obs. 134 60 134 60 134 60
Adjusted R2 0.48 0.51 0.50 0.58 0.41 0.46
Notes: This table presents the impact of diversi¯cation on pro¯tability and stability measures using OLS
estimations for the EU and larger US banks samples. Variables are averaged over the whole period. Bank
pro¯tability measures are the risk-adjusted return on average assets (RAROAA), the risk-adjusted return
on average equity (RAROAE) and Z-Score. Non-interest income (NONsh) and DIV are income diver-
si¯cation variables. The natural log of total assets (SIZE), the tangible equity to total assets (Equity/TA),
loans to total assets (Loans/TA), the cost to income ratio (Cost income), lagged loan loss provisions
(LLP), Annual growth of assets (Asset growth) and its square (Asset Growth2) are the bank-speci¯c
control variables. All regressions include country dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate statistical signi¯cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
























































































Since in the econometric estimation, NONsh and DIV are considered as explan-
atory variables but they share a common root, it is worth examining their joint e®ect
on dependent variables. More speci¯cally, when the share of non-interest revenues
changes (for example, it increases its level), two di®erent e®ects occur. The ¯rst one is
simply a greater exposure to this source of revenues: the outcome of this event can be
read directly observing the coe±cients associated to NONsh. The second one is
linked to the income diversi¯cation level and requires a speci¯c explanation.
Since interest and non-interest shares sum to one, the equation for calculating
DIV can be written as follows (Eq. (4.1)):
DIV ¼ 2NONsh 2NONsh2: ð4:1Þ





(mean) ROAA ROAE RAROAA RAROAE Z-Score
NONsh 0.02*** 0.11 0.01** 0.13** 1:98 3:43 94:82***
(0.005) (0.069) (0.004) (0.065) (3.463) (2.909) (28.714)
DIV 0:00 0.01 0:01*** 0:20*** 2.06 4.77* 48.57
(0.005) (0.062) (0.004) (0.064) (3.404) (2.882) (31.576)
TA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.70*** 0.47*** 5.91***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.138) (0.128) (1.510)
Equity/TA 0.02** 0.42*** 0.00 1:15*** 13:67*** 10:43** 192.58***
(0.007) (0.093) (0.008) (0.121) (4.875) (4.164) (55.400)
Loans/TA 0:00*** 0:03** 0.00*** 0.04** 5:31*** 4:57*** 49:05***
(0.001) (0.015) (0.001) (0.021) (1.234) (1.078) (14.024)
Cost income 0:03*** 0:30*** 0.01*** 0.18*** 14:12*** 13:72*** 99:89***
(0.002) (0.019) (0.002) (0.026) (0.963) (0.921) (9.777)
LLP 0:47*** 5:97*** 0.58*** 7.69*** 144:35*** 129:56*** 1744:44***
(0.039) (0.514) (0.051) (0.709) (17.086) (15.466) (202.820)
Asset growth 0.01** 0.30*** 0:02*** 0:48*** 2.07 0:23 7.94
(0.005) (0.068) (0.006) (0.083) (2.538) (2.280) (26.023)
Asset growth2 0:02* 0:54*** 0.04*** 0.94*** 0:88 3.49 30:93
(0.011) (0.140) (0.012) (0.172) (6.070) (6.026) (59.457)
Constant 0.03*** 0.25*** 0:01*** 0:00 13.18*** 13.96*** 107.56***
(0.003) (0.040) (0.004) (0.060) (2.614) (2.421) (28.184)
No. of Obs. 1056 1056 1056 1056 1056 1056 1056
Adjusted R2 0.85 0.84 0.75 0.78 0.51 0.52 0.43
Notes: This table presents the impact of diversi¯cation on pro¯tability and stability measures using OLS
estimations for the smaller US banks sample. Variables are averaged over the whole period. Dependent
variables of these estimations are the level and volatility of ROAA and ROAE, the risk-adjusted return on
average assets (RAROAA), the risk-adjusted return on average equity (RAROAE) and Z-Score. Non-
interest income (NONsh) and DIV are income diversi¯cation variables. The natural log of total assets
(SIZE), the tangible equity to total assets (Equity/TA), loans to total assets (Loans/TA), the cost to
income ratio (Cost income), lagged loan loss provisions (LLP), Annual growth of assets (Asset growth)
and its square (Asset Growth2) are the bank-speci¯c control variables. All regressions include country
dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical signi¯cance at the 1%,
5% and 10% level, respectively.
























































































An increase in the level of NONsh has two consequences on DIV (a linear and a
quadratic one) that are usually referred as direct and indirect e®ects in the literature
(Stiroh & Rumble 2006). The total or \net" in°uence of a change in NONsh on the
dependent variable can be calculated as the sum of these two e®ects.
We investigate this issue for our risk-adjusted measures (RAROAA, RAROAE,
Z-Score), by evaluating the partial and total e®ect of a 1% increase of the non-
interest share of revenues for di®erent percentiles of NONsh for each subsample of
banks. This allows us to explore the e®ect of a change in NONsh for banks that show
di®erent compositions of revenues: in fact, we can expect that the bene¯ts stemming
from diversi¯cation strategies change for di®erent levels of NONsh.
A very easy way to understand this statement is considering two banks that have
a level of NONsh equal to 0.4 and 0.6 (40% and 60%, respectively). An increase in
NONsh means a gain in diversi¯cation for the ¯rst bank, but more concentration for
the second one. DIV is initially equal to 0.48 for both banks; however, after the
change observed in NONsh, its level is equal to 0.4838 for the ¯rst bank and 0.4578
for the second.
We consider the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentile of NONsh for each
group of banks. Results for RAROAA are presented in Table 7.
The most noticeable result is the recurring negative sign of the net e®ect for EU
banks: both direct and indirect e®ects go in this direction. This outcome is indirectly
reinforced by the only positive coe±cient that can be found in the highest percentile
column for the indirect e®ect: considering that for this cohort the average level of
NONsh is 0.55, an increase in this variable means a concentration strategy and not a
diversi¯cation one.
US banks  larger and smaller  show a common pattern of coe±cients: they
are mainly negative for the direct e®ect and positive for the indirect e®ect. The total
in°uence on RAROAA is mainly positive but turns to negative for the highest
percentiles. This suggests that an increase in NONsh provides di®erent outcomes
across diverse levels of non-interest income revenues (for instance, banks that are
starting their diversi¯cation strategy or those that already express higher weights of
non-interest income).
Table 8 shows the direct, indirect and total e®ect of a change in NONsh on
RAROAE.
Overall, results remain consistent. For European banks almost all coe±cients
remain negative, while for US banks we have negative direct e®ects that are coun-
terbalanced by positive indirect ones. The total e®ect is mainly positive for the latter
sample, while statistical signi¯cance varies with the chosen percentile.
Table 9 completes this analysis for the Z-Score.
Here, coe±cients for the indirect e®ect turn to positive for European banks, but
the total e®ect remains negative. For bigger US banks, coe±cients are consistent
with previous results. For smaller US banks, instead, positive e®ects of diversi¯cation
are not su±cient to overcome the negative outcomes stemming from a greater
























































































exposure to non-interest revenues. This latter result is stable across all columns,
while statistical signi¯cance is present only for higher percentiles.
Considered altogether, results from this alternative setting con¯rm again our
hypotheses, in particular the expected weak signi¯cance of NONsh (H3) and the
variability across banking systems and bank characteristics (H4).
4.2. Panel analysis
Our empirical analysis includes also several panel estimations. As for the previous
analysis, we ¯rst focus on EU and larger US banks, extending then the comparison to
smaller US banks.
Table 10 shows the results of dynamic estimates for the ¯rst comparison.
Besides a weak autocorrelation of the dependent variables, the regressions con-
¯rm the previous analysis. NONsh and DIV are associated respectively with negative
and positive coe±cients, while rarely being statistically signi¯cant, con¯rming all our
hypotheses. Among the other explanatory variables, it is worth noting that cost-
Table 7. Estimated impact of a 1% change in NONsh on RAROAA.
NONsh percentiles 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
European banks Direct e®ect 0:040 0:040 0:040 0:040 0:040
0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041
Indirect e®ect 0:017 0:012 0:005 0:001 0.004
0.051 0.037 0.016 0.003 0.011
Total e®ect 0:057 0:053 0:046*** 0:041*** 0:037***
0.048 0.035 0.015 0.003 0.010
Bigger US banks Direct e®ect 0:106* 0:106* 0:106* 0:106* 0:106*
0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060
Indirect e®ect 0.216** 0.164** 0.126** 0.087** 0.036**
0.097 0.073 0.056 0.039 0.016
Total e®ect 0.110 0.058 0.020 0:019 0:07***
0.083 0.063 0.048 0.033 0.014
Smaller US banks Direct e®ect 0:020 0:020 0:020 0:020 0:020
0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035
Indirect e®ect 0.035 0.032 0.027 0.022 0.017
0.059 0.053 0.045 0.036 0.028
Total e®ect 0.016 0.012 0.007 0.002 0:003
0.022 0.020 0.017 0.014 0.010
Notes: The table is built on the results of regressions on average values as reported in Tables 5 and 6.
Results are evaluated at di®erent average levels of NONsh, corresponding to the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th
and 90th percentile of each sample of banks. The corresponding average ¯gures for European Banks are
0.23, 0.30, 0.41, 0.48 and 0.55. For the bigger US banks, the values are equal to 0.11, 0.20, 0.27, 0.34
and 0.43, while for smaller US banks the corresponding values are 0.06, 0.10, 0.17, 0.23 and 0.29. Direct
e®ect measures the impact of a 1% increase in the average level of NONsh on the dependent variable
(RAROAA); indirect e®ect is calculated as the impact of diversi¯cation on the dependent variable,
given a 1% increase in NONsh. Total e®ect is the sum of direct and indirect e®ect. Standard errors are
reported in bold below the estimated coe±cients. ***, **, * indicate statistical signi¯cance at the 1%,
5% and 10% level, respectively.
























































































income and loan loss provisioning still show negative coe±cients, but these are
statistically signi¯cant only in the US bank subsample. Asset growth has a negative
e®ect on risk-return measures, while the opposite is true for the level of tangible
equity.
Table 11 compares within and between estimators for static panel analyses.
Once more, NONsh and DIV take the expected sign (hypotheses H1 and H2).
However, the statistical signi¯cance of the coe±cients is relatively low (hypothesis H3).
Ine±ciency and low loan quality adversely a®ect risk-return measures. The same
is true for loans share, which exhibits signi¯cant coe±cients in RAROAA and
RAROAE between-regressions for European banks. The changing sign of some
coe±cients in within and between regressions (for example, those associated with
asset growth) seems to indicate that individual e®ects have a larger impact in
explaining the risk-adjusted pro¯tability.
This represents a relevant ¯nding and is also con¯rmed by the results obtained on
the smaller US banks subsample (Table 12) and once again supports our last hy-
pothesis (H4).
Table 8. Estimated impact of a 1% change in NONsh on RAROAE.
NONsh percentiles 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
European banks Direct e®ect 0:023 0:023 0:023 0:023 0:023
0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037
Indirect e®ect 0:052 0:037 0:016 0:003 0.011
0.049 0.036 0.015 0.003 0.011
Total e®ect 0:075* 0:06* 0:039*** 0:026*** 0:012
0.043 0.031 0.013 0.002 0.009
Bigger US banks Direct e®ect 0:098* 0:098* 0:098* 0:098* 0:098*
0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058
Indirect e®ect 0.222** 0.168** 0.129** 0.089** 0.037**
0.089 0.068 0.052 0.036 0.015
Total e®ect 0.124* 0.070 0.031 0:009 0:061***
0.072 0.054 0.042 0.029 0.012
Smaller US banks Direct e®ect 0:034 0:034 0:034 0:034 0:034
0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029
Indirect e®ect 0.082* 0.075* 0.063* 0.051* 0.039*
0.050 0.045 0.038 0.031 0.023
Total e®ect 0.048** 0.04** 0.029** 0.017 0.004
0.019 0.017 0.015 0.012 0.009
Notes: The table is built on the results of regressions on average values as reported in Tables 5 and 6.
Results are evaluated at di®erent average levels of NONsh, corresponding to the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th
and 90th percentile of each sample of banks. The corresponding average ¯gures for European Banks are
0.23, 0.30, 0.41, 0.48 and 0.55. For the bigger US banks, the values are equal to 0.11, 0.20, 0.27, 0.34 and
0.43, while for smaller US banks the corresponding values are 0.06, 0.10, 0.17, 0.23 and 0.29. Direct e®ect
measures the impact of a 1% increase in the average level of NONsh on the dependent variable
(RAROAE); indirect e®ect is calculated as the impact of diversi¯cation on the dependent variable, given
a 1% increase in NONsh. Total e®ect is the sum of direct and indirect e®ect. Standard errors are reported
in bold below the estimated coe±cients. ***, **, * indicate statistical signi¯cance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively.
























































































In this case, coe±cients associated with DIV and Equity/TA change sign in
within and between estimations. Since between estimators explore the cross-sectional
nature of data, the last three columns are more similar to the outcome of the previous
analysis on mean values (see Table 6). NONsh is still characterized by negative
coe±cients and the same holds for loans share, Cost income and LLP.
All econometric estimations draw a picture in which there is not a clear-cut
evidence of a relationship between income diversi¯cation and risk-adjusted perfor-
mance of banks. This is especially true for the European banks, which exhibit weak
statistical signi¯cance for the coe±cients associated to non-interest share of income
and diversi¯cation level. Moreover, the joint e®ect of these variables, when signi¯-
cant, is negative. The implication of this outcome is that during the recent crisis
period a greater balance of sources of revenue has not provided better risk-adjusted
results for European banks.
Instead, for US banks, the opposite seems to be true. A greater exposure to non-
interest income has usually a negative impact on risk-adjusted measures, but
Table 9. Estimated impact of a 1% change in NONsh on Z-Score.
NONsh percentiles 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
European banks Direct e®ect 0:875 0:875 0:875 0:875 0:875
0.439 0.439 0.439 0.439 0.439
Indirect e®ect 0.598 0.433 0.186 0.032 0:130
0.738 0.534 0.230 0.040 0.160
Total e®ect 0:276 0:442 0:688*** 0:842*** 1:004***
0.597 0.432 0.186 0.032 0.129
Bigger US banks Direct e®ect 1:239** 1:239** 1:239** 1:239** 1:239**
0.541 0.541 0.541 0.541 0.541
Indirect e®ect 1.814* 1.376* 1.055* 0.729* 0.302*
0.956 0.725 0.556 0.384 0.159
Total e®ect 0.575 0.136 0:184 0:510 0:937***
0.826 0.626 0.480 0.332 0.137
Smaller US banks Direct e®ect 0:948*** 0:948*** 0:948*** 0:948*** 0:948***
0.287 0.287 0.287 0.287 0.287
Indirect e®ect 0.837 0.760 0.640 0.518 0.393
0.544 0.494 0.416 0.337 0.255
Total e®ect 0:111 0:188 0:308** 0:431*** 0:555***
0.219 0.199 0.167 0.135 0.103
Notes: The table is built on the results of regressions on average values as reported in Tables 5 and 6.
Results are evaluated at di®erent average levels of NONsh, corresponding to the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th
and 90th percentile of each sample of banks. The corresponding average ¯gures for European Banks are
0.23, 0.30, 0.41, 0.48 and 0.55. For the bigger US banks, the values are equal to 0.11, 0.20, 0.27, 0.34 and
0.43, while for smaller US banks the corresponding values are 0.06, 0.10, 0.17, 0.23 and 0.29. Direct
e®ect measures the impact of a 1% increase in the average level of NONsh on the dependent variable
(Z-Score); indirect e®ect is calculated as the impact of diversi¯cation on the dependent variable, given a
1% increase in NONsh. Total e®ect is the sum of direct and indirect e®ect. Standard errors are reported
in bold below the estimated coe±cients. ***, **, * indicate statistical signi¯cance at the 1%, 5% and
10% level, respectively.
























































































diversi¯cation e®ects are usually strong enough to counterbalance this e®ect. We ¯nd
evidence for this relationship in particular for smaller and less diversi¯ed banks.
We see this as a signi¯cant contribution to the literature since it holds in a very
di®erent economic environment. The seminal work by Stiroh & Rumble (2006) has
been conducted in a period of less ¯nancial turbulence compared to our analysis. In
recent crisis and post-crisis years, both interest and non-interest revenues have
Table 10. Fixed-e®ect dynamic panel regression (European and larger US banks).
RAROAA RAROAE Z-Score







NONsh 3.34 17:11** 1:34 15:20 72:25 129:53
(18.808) (7.876) (17.493) (9.500) (196.452) (83.009)
DIV 0.01 20.99* 10.17 28.51 84.29 99.12
(18.178) (11.056) (17.566) (18.323) (183.614) (92.960)
TA 0.95 2.35 1:03 1.30 10:60 21.22
(2.021) (1.580) (1.762) (1.890) (20.820) (17.851)
Equity/TA 8.41 27.87* 19.86 15.12 722.85** 377.51*
(25.153) (15.539) (21.888) (12.956) (277.730) (219.709)
Loans/TA 3.69 1.22 1.10 0:37 5.63 16:93
(5.674) (7.301) (5.670) (5.958) (67.042) (99.498)
Cost income 6:11*** 2:01 6:20*** 4:55* 60:97*** 10:17
(2.136) (2.244) (2.077) (2.614) (21.551) (27.292)
LLP 154:63*** 33:26 113:20*** 58:70 756:41** 262:51
(35.620) (37.029) (34.943) (44.328) (371.100) (442.118)
Asset growth 5:25 1:70 7:18 2:47 87:23* 25:06
(4.736) (3.567) (4.642) (4.216) (44.238) (50.328)
Asset growth2 10:14 4.20 5:46 3.17 43:98 61.55
(9.180) (9.286) (8.739) (12.523) (87.845) (122.720)
Constant 9:16 41:08 19.81 22:59 198.76 323:16
(33.848) (31.172) (29.016) (37.244) (350.710) (336.247)
No. of Obs. 936 383 936 372 935 382
No. of Banks 134 60 134 60 134 60
Adjusted R2 0.24 0.17 0.26 0.13 0.18 0.06
Notes: This table presents the impact of diversi¯cation on risk-adjusted pro¯tability measures using
dynamic ¯xed-e®ects panel estimations for the EU and larger US banks samples. Bank and time ¯xed
e®ect are used. Bank pro¯tability measures are the risk-adjusted return on average assets (RAR-
OAA), the risk-adjusted return on average equity (RAROAE) and Z-Score. Non-interest income
(NONsh) and DIV are income diversi¯cation variables. The natural log of total assets (SIZE), the
tangible equity to total assets (Equity/TA), loans to total assets (Loans/TA), the cost to income
ratio (Cost income), lagged loan loss provisions (LLP), Annual growth of assets (Asset growth) and
its square (Asset Growth2) are the bank-speci¯c control variables. All regressions include interacted
country-time dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical
signi¯cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































experienced a high volatility, with uncertain e®ects on the bene¯cial portfolio-e®ect
usually attributed to diversi¯cation. Our results suggest that for US banks these
macroeconomic di®erences have not changed the relationship between NONsh, DIV
and risk-adjusted performance measures.
Given its current modest relative size, it is unlikely that this result is driven by
the emergence of alternative business models or competitors from the FinTech in-
dustry. Despite it was not the aim of this paper to speci¯cally test a di®erentiated
approach from regulation and supervision in the EU and US markets, this is rea-
sonably a signi¯cant contributing factor in explaining why responses vary so widely
between the two banking systems. However, results from the between estimators as
well as the high variability of statistical signi¯cance of covariates in our di®erent
econometric approaches suggest another conclusion. Most part of the unreliability of
diversi¯cation strategies in improving performance or providing stability lies in ¯rm-
speci¯c factors, rather than in market-wide or bigger exogenous shocks.
4.3. Policy implications
In our view, our results lead to signi¯cant policy implications.
On one side, we con¯rmed empirically that revenue diversi¯cation in banking is a
complex matter. Its ability to enhance the level and the stability of performance is
limited, since they seem more closely linked to ¯rm- and market-speci¯c features.
Moreover, the robustness of revenues diversity is especially questionable during
¯nancial turmoil.
The impact of non-interest revenues is signi¯cant and negative on bank risk for
both US (large and small) and EU institutions. At the same time, it is signi¯cant and
negative for risk-adjusted performance measures for larger US banks, whereas it is
signi¯cant and positive for smaller US banks only for the ROAA.
We argue that diversi¯cation augments ¯rm risk, but at the same time is unable
to enhance pro¯tability to balance this e®ect or is even harmful (for larger US
institutions). The bene¯t for smaller US banks may be attributed to their overall
lower engagement in such activities, as well as a potential larger bene¯t for entities
initiating non-interest-bearing operations. Studying the impact of changes in non-
interest revenues in di®erent business models (de¯ned by selected percentiles of the
related distribution) strengthens this claim.
Among other variables, those that bear most signi¯cance in both markets and
regardless of the size of institutions are the cost e±ciency and the quality of the credit
portfolio. Despite not further investigated in this paper but incidentally arising from
our results, we argue that diversi¯cation, by combining human resources, capital and
expertise, shows a short-term improvement of cost e±ciency and pro¯tability but, in
the long run, venturing in non-interest revenues could result in a higher volatility of
earnings.
Moreover, shifting e®orts from traditional to innovative banking activities may
lower the attention, at least partially, to the quality of the loan portfolio.
























































































Alternatively, non-interest-bearing activities may be the result of the worsening
quality of the loan portfolio, without evidence of a gain in terms of risk-adjusted
performance.
The overall implication of our results is a call for greater scrutiny and care, for
both banks and supervisors, before assuming that diversi¯cation could provide an
easy path to restore or improve performance, without a®ecting risks, at the ¯rm-level
and in terms of ¯nancial stability. This is particularly relevant if revenue diversity is
a direct response to worsening macroeconomic conditions.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the impact of revenue diversi¯cation on bank pro¯t-
ability and its volatility. We examine the relationship between the degree of diver-
si¯cation and several measures of risk-return pro¯les in a cross-country analysis,
including 1250 listed EU and US banks from Q1-2008 to Q4-2016.
Through OLS regressions, dynamic ¯xed-e®ect panel models and static panel
regressions, we ¯nd that diversi¯cation is not clearly associated with the level or
quality of performance, that bene¯ts change over time and, where present, show
signi¯cant variability. Moreover, we ¯nd a di®erent behavior in US and EU banks in
terms of diversi¯cation bene¯ts.
European banks do not show a material impact of non-interest revenues on both
nominal and risk-adjusted performance measures, while for US banks e®ects are
signi¯cant in terms of performance volatility and risk-adjusted pro¯tability, but
substantially di®erent for smaller and larger institutions. Finally, we show that ¯rm-
speci¯c diversi¯cation strategies matter more than the overall sectoral pursuit of
revenue diversity over time.
Our results provide additional evidence on the limitations of diversi¯cation in the
banking sector, supporting signi¯cant policy implications. Supervisors should be
careful in expecting that more revenue diversity, especially in Europe, bears neces-
sarily bene¯ts for the banking system. The diversity and adequacy of business models
to di®erent economic environments, rather than alternative revenue sources, seems
to produce greater and persistent e®ects on bank pro¯tability and volatility.
In terms of future research, it could be useful to understand the impact of speci¯c
exogenous (for instance changes in regulation or supervision, growth of the FinTech
sector) as well as endogenous shock (such as human capital) on pro¯tability and
stability, especially in terms of ¯rm-level factors that determine a di®erent response
from banks.
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